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ABSTRACT

LEGISLATING CITIZENSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES: THE IMPACT OF STATE
BUILDING ON WOMAN SUFFRAGE LEGISLATION, 1848-1918

Eric C. Dahlin
Department of Sociology
Master of Science

This is a state-level analysis of the impact of state building on woman suffrage
legislation in the United States. This study examines all states in which state legislatures
were conferred the power to submit a constitutional amendment to the electorate for
approval. I use a sequential random-effects logistic regression model to estimate the
effects of state building on legislative outcome. Legislative outcome is measured in three
stages: whether or not a bill is introduced in either the House or the Senate during a
legislative session, whether or not a bill is voted on in either the House or the Senate
during a legislative session, and whether or not a bill is passed in either the House or the
Senate during a legislative session. The data used in this study were collected from
legislative journals and other sources which represent the most comprehensive and
accurate data that have been used to study woman suffrage legislation.
Most studies of woman suffrage explain success by concentrating on changing
gender norms. While this may have explained eventual success, it overlooks barriers that

existed within state governments. Only 15 states granted full woman suffrage prior to the
Nineteenth Amendment, the majority of which were in the West. I argue that
understanding the structure of state governments provides insight into the success of
western states and also provides insight into the timing of success. I do this by moving
beyond contemporary social movement theory and by adapting aspects of institutional
politics theory and organizational theory. Specifically, I examine the dynamics of
partisan politics, organizational characteristics of state government, and the legislative
process. I find that partisan politics and organizational dynamics impact legislative
success. Specifically, legislatures are more likely to pass suffrage bills in states that are
more democratized, that are characterized by reform-oriented regimes, where woman
suffrage advocates have a greater political presence, where there is less structural inertia,
and where a smaller constitutional majority is required.
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Chapter 1 – Literature review

The object of this study is to demonstrate the impact of state building on woman
suffrage legislation in the United States. I do this by examining the impact of state
governments’ structure on the success of woman suffrage bills. In particular, I am
interested in understanding which characteristics of state government facilitated the
success of suffrage legislation in western states relative to their eastern counterparts.
Before the Nineteenth Amendment was ratified August 18, 1920, 15 states
granted full suffrage to women. Of these 15 states, 13 were west of the Mississippi
River. Considering the woman suffrage movement had more social movement resources
in the eastern states (i.e., suffrage leaders, suffrage organizations, and organizational
membership), why were western states more successful enfranchising women? To
answer this question I examine elements of state government that facilitated or
constrained woman suffrage legislation.
While many scholars have studied the influence of cultural processes on the
woman suffrage movement, none have systematically analyzed the effect of state
government on woman suffrage. Characteristics of state government in the West played
an important role in creating a political environment that was conducive to legislative
success. My research adapts aspects of institutional politics theory that deal with lawmaking: democratization, reform-oriented regimes, and political presence (Amenta and
Halfmann 2000). In addition, I move beyond institutional politics theory by analyzing
organizational characteristics of state government. These include imprinting, structural
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inertia, legislative size, mimetic isomorphism, and the legislative process. This study
draws from institutional politics theory and organizational theory to demonstrate the
impact of the structure of state government on legislative success. Legislative success is
determined by measuring whether or not a full woman suffrage bill is introduced, voted
on, or passed during a legislative session.
A legislative proposal was only one way a state legislature could amend their
constitution. Methods of amending state constitutions include
“(1) proposal of amendments by the legislative assembly, followed in the vast
majority of states by popular ratification, (2) proposal of amendments by the
voters through constitutional initiative with subsequent approval by the legislature
and/or the electorate, and (3) constitutional convention, the products of whose
labors are usually submitted to the voters for their approval” (Sturm 1954: 18).
Provisions regulating the methods of amending the constitution were stipulated in each
state constitution. These provisions determined the difficulty of constitutional change
and varied by state.
Scholars usually explain woman suffrage success in the West by citing cultural
changes in gender norms during the nineteenth century and the early twentieth century.
However, I contend that scholars need to supplement their cultural explanations of
woman suffrage success with a better understanding of state government and the process
of amending the constitution. This is crucial in order to grasp the timing of woman
suffrage success at the state level because constitutional amendment requirements
mediated cultural changes by obstructing legislation and popular sentiment. Considering
that the timing of suffrage success varied by state and some states were completely
unsuccessful despite vast resources and changing cultural norms, woman suffrage
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scholars must take a closer look at the role of state legislatures in amending state
constitutions.

Historical background
The roots of the woman suffrage movement in the United States can be traced to the
Seneca Falls Convention in 1848. In Seneca Falls, New York, a group of men and
women met to discuss injustices against women and the elimination of gender inequality.
The topics included property rights, educational opportunities, wages, and woman
suffrage. From Seneca Falls the woman suffrage movement spanned 72 years,
culminating in the ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment in 1920.
In addition to being the birthplace of the woman suffrage movement in the U. S.,
the state of New York was also headquarters for the National Woman Suffrage
Association (NWSA). The NWSA was organized in 1869, and was founded by Elizabeth
Cady Stanton and Susan B. Anthony. It was organized to secure voting rights for women
by focusing on changing the federal constitution. During the same year that the NWSA
was established, Lucy Stone and her husband Henry Blackwell established the American
Woman Suffrage Association (AWSA) which was headquartered in Boston. The AWSA
differed ideologically from the NWSA. For instance, The AWSA supported the right of
blacks to vote “while at the same time working for the vote for women” (Hannam et al.
2000: 12). Another point of difference was that the AWSA focused primarily on
securing woman suffrage at the state level. Other than voting rights for blacks and
focusing on state-level campaigns rather than a federal amendment, issues separating
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these organizations included the NWSA’s acceptance of “free love” and their disapproval
of androcentrism within the religious establishment (Banaszak 1996). As time went on,
however, the NWSA became more ideologically moderate which set the stage for the two
organizations to merge.
In 1890, the AWSA and NWSA merged to form the National American Woman
Suffrage Association (NAWSA) (Hannam et al 2000). This further centralized the
organizational structure of the suffrage movement in the eastern U. S. (Giele 1995).
Since the national suffrage organization was located in the East, most of the suffrage
leaders came from the East and the majority of the local chapters were located in the East
before later spreading to the Midwest (Banaszak 1996). Therefore, many of the
suffragists’ early efforts were concentrated in the East. Suffrage activity took place in
the West but it was not as well organized due to fewer financial resources, fewer
members of suffrage organizations, fewer suffrage leaders, as well as geographic
isolation from other local suffrage organizations (Flexner 1970).
Despite the leadership and the organizational activity in the eastern U. S., woman
suffrage was first adopted in western states and territories. Table 1 lists the states and
territories that granted full woman suffrage before the ratification of the Nineteenth
Amendment. Wyoming Territory passed woman suffrage as early as 1869 despite a
small number of woman suffragists in the state (Larson 1965). Wyoming was also the
first state to give women the vote when it achieved statehood in 1890. One year after
Wyoming Territory passed woman suffrage, Utah Territory followed; though woman
suffrage was later revoked by the Edmunds-Tucker Act which was passed by Congress in
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1887 (Beeton 1986). In 1893, Colorado became the second state to grant woman
suffrage, followed by Idaho and Utah in 1896. Although Illinois and Rhode Island
granted presidential suffrage in 1913 and 1917, respectively, New York was the first state
east of the Mississippi to grant full woman suffrage in 1917. In 1918, Michigan became
the second eastern state to grant full woman suffrage. New York and Michigan were the
only eastern states to pass full woman suffrage before the Nineteenth Amendment.

Woman suffrage research
Few comparative state-level studies have addressed woman suffrage and the political
process, especially in the West. Most studies are limited to individual state campaigns or
to the national movement. T. A. Larson (1965, 1970, 1972, 1976) and Beverly Beeton
(1986) have done the most extensive work on woman suffrage in the West. Their
research examines social, economic, and political factors that influenced the adoption of
woman suffrage. However, their research is limited mainly to the Intermountain West.
Additionally, they do little comparative analysis of state-level government
characteristics.
Research examining the national suffrage movement (Stanton et al. 1881; Flexner
1970; Giele 1995; Banaszak 1996) focuses on the movement’s organization and
leadership in the eastern states. It underestimates the significance of suffrage success in
the western states and their contribution to the national woman suffrage movement.
Although sociologists are beginning to explore the significance of the woman suffrage
movement in the West (McCammon and Campbell 2001; Schiffman 1998), no study
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systematically examines characteristics of state governments that may have impeded
success or alternatively produced a conducive political environment.
McCammon and Campbell’s (2001) study of woman suffrage in the West
attributes success to the West’s unique culture which increased opportunities for women.
They maintain that sentiments of politicians concerning the appropriate roles of women
in society shifted as gender norms changed, increasing support for woman suffrage. In
another study, McCammon et al. (2001) identify gendered opportunities that changed
expectations concerning voting rights. Two of the variables they identify as gendered
opportunities were significant in their model: the rise of the “new woman” and World
War I. The rise of the “new woman” resulted from increased education, working outside
the home, professional careers, divorce, involvement in the public sphere, and fewer
children. Women’s contributions in World War I–working in factories and farms, fund
raising for oversea hospitals, and organizing student nurses–changed gender expectations
since women filled roles previously filled by men. These changes also opened doors in
the political arena by challenging traditional gender norms that were previously limited to
men.
Woman suffrage scholars also attribute woman suffrage success in the West to the
unique political culture. The Western frontier closed in 1912 and until that time
territorial governments provided a fertile testing ground for legislative innovation.
Beeton (1986) argues that territories could experiment with woman suffrage while not
threatening “the political stability of the established states or the national political scene”
since “territorial voters could not vote for their own governors or for the President” (xi).
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Territorial governors were appointed by the federal government and territorial
governments were largely controlled by Congress. Territories were viewed as nonthreatening, temporary, and alterable. As a result, territorial governments had fewer
procedural constraints and were more easily altered than states. For example, amending
territorial constitutions did not require a popular referendum. In addition, if any political
problems occurred, Congress could simply modify the territorial government (Beeton
1986; Dye 1985).
Clemens (1997) extends Beeton’s argument–that territories were a testing ground
for new legislation–to the newer western states in the nineteenth century. Clemens calls
newly formed western states an “experiment station” because they provided opportunities
for political innovation. New states were less constrained by traditional party systems
and were more liberated from traditional elites. Consequently, institutional innovation
was more common. Popular groups were better able to initiate and institute alternatives
in the polity. This is manifest by the legislative reforms adopted by western states.
Clemens demonstrates that states in the West were more innovative by showing that they
were more likely to adopt reforms like the Australian ballot, the mandatory direct
primary, the initiative and referendum, and woman suffrage. These reforms opened the
door to political innovation and loosened the grip of traditional parties on the political
status quo. Consequently, some suggest that third party challenges encouraged woman
suffrage success. However, McCammon et al. (2001) find that third party challenges
(measure as the percentage of seats in the state legislature held by third parties) did not
significantly increase the likelihood of suffrage success.
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A survey of gubernatorial elections reveals that one particular political party did
not dominate states in which woman suffrage was adopted. Table 2 compares the states
that granted full suffrage before the Nineteenth Amendment and lists which party’s
gubernatorial candidate received the most votes in the election prior to the year or during
the same year that suffrage was adopted. Seven of the fifteen states elected a Republican
governor, five of the states elected Democratic governors, and three elected governors
from other parties. Since one party did not dominate the elections in these states, partisan
support by one particular party did not seem to be a determining factor. Table 2
demonstrates that what mattered most was not which party supported woman suffrage
but, more likely, that it was a platform of a political party’s campaign.
Other reasons scholars give for early suffrage success in the West are listed by
Schiffman (1998). These include smaller populations, smaller legislatures to convince,
greater equality and democracy. And, because of the scarcity of women in the West,
states passed woman suffrage to encourage the immigration of women (see also Beeton
1986; Flexner 1970; Larson 1970). Schiffman (1998) asserts, however, that while some
of these factors may have contributed to suffrage in the West, “these claims have not
been empirically tested” (6). While several studies of woman suffrage mention suffrage
activity in the West, they do not underscore its significance and they are biased toward
eastern states due to the lack of available data and due to the lack of organization in the
West (Banaszak 1996; Stanton et al. 1881).
Another problem with this literature is that is does not address specific and
systematic political processes of state government. State suffrage campaigns were not
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exclusively dependent on cultural changes. State building was also a factor. In his
monograph on the modification of practices concerning the ordaining of women in
religious denominations, Chaves (1997) states that changing practices were not only a
result of cultural changes, but also internal organizational processes. Chaves (1996)
maintains that if changes in cultural norms were all that mattered, denominational change
would have been relatively uniform. However, denominations did not uniformly change
their practices. Not only was there variation but some denominations did not ordain
women ministers at all. Therefore, Chaves contends that internal organizational
dynamics must also be studied to understand the variation in the timing of organizational
change. Similarly, I argue that cultural change does not tell the entire story of woman
suffrage success. Internal organizational dynamics of state government also played an
important role in the adoption of woman suffrage.

Social movement theory
Sociological research on the woman suffrage movement is often influenced by theories of
social movements. Resource mobilization, political opportunity structure, and cultural
framing processes have animated studies of woman suffrage (Banaszak 1996; Giele
1995; King 2001; McCammon et al. 2001; Schiffman 1998). Unfortunately, these
theories are insufficient for explaining state-level legislative outcomes.
Most of the research on social movements from the resource mobilization
perspective emphasizes the rational organization of social movements. According to
resource mobilization theorists, social movements result from rational calculated

9

behavior by its members and leaders. Their goals and strategies are clear. Social
movements form because of long-term changes in resources, organizations, and
opportunities (Jenkins 1995). For example, the civil rights movement emerged in the
1950s due to changes in resources among blacks. Changes taking place during this time
include blacks migrating from the poverty-stricken South, black churches in the urban
south becoming more affluent, expanding black middle- and working-classes, and
growing college enrollments among blacks. All of these changes provided resources for
blacks and increased their ability to mobilize (McAdam 1982).
Aldon Morris (1995) studies the black sit-in movement in the South during the
early 1960s and concludes that its success came by drawing on existing resources
provided by the social networks of black churches and colleges. Many of the sit-in
movement leaders were school teachers and church leaders. Consequently, leaders had a
pool of participants from which to draw. Morris says, “The spread of the sit-ins followed
the networks of the preexisting institutional networks” (363). By accessing existing
social networks black sit-in leaders increased the ability of the black sit-in movement to
organize and mobilize members.
Other studies confirm the impact of already existing social networks on social
movements and they also emphasize the importance of accessing already existing
organizations (McAdam 1988; Gould 1995). Giele (1995) argues that the woman
suffrage movement developed with the help of already existing organizations. She
identifies many organizations in which women participated during the first half of the
nineteenth century before the principal suffrage movement; namely missionary and moral
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reform societies. From these arose local temperance groups and eventually the Woman’s
Christian Temperance Union (WCTU). Giele contends that the temperance movement
and the WCTU were crucial to the success of the woman suffrage movement. The
WCTU “constituted a strong social movement organization that reached into local
communities and linked individual women to the larger feminist movement. . . .(It)
developed a reform strategy linking temperance and woman’s rights that mobilized
immense support nationally as well as locally” (64).
This literature explains the importance of resources, especially organizational
resources and social networks, to the vitality of movement emergence and to eventual
success. However, resource mobilization is a not sufficient condition for social
movement success. This is evidenced by the woman suffrage movement since women
were enfranchised in the Intermountain West before they were enfranchised in the East.
In his analysis of the woman suffrage movement in the western U. S., King (2001) shows
that 14 out of 22 states introduced their first suffrage bill in the state or territorial
legislature before their first suffrage organization existed. Contrary theories of resource
mobilization theorists, Table 3 reveals that woman suffrage activity often took place in
states before movement leaders had mobilized organizational resources.
Another concept used by social movement theorists emphasizes political process
and identifies elements of the political opportunity structure that influence social
movement outcomes. Skocpol and Campbell (1995) assert that after a social movement
emerges, political opportunity structure becomes important. Political opportunity
structure is used to understand the political environment of a social movement. The
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common feature of these studies is an emphasis on the legal and administrative rules of
the political system. Scholars use this approach to understand the timing and fate of
movements in the context of opportunities afforded by the political structure.
Most studies of political opportunity structure fall into one of two categories. The
first seeks to explain movement emergence in relation to the changing political structure.
Changes in the political structure create opportunities for social movements to emerge
and to increase their legitimacy and support. The second category seeks to explain the
success of cross-national, comparable social movements (McAdam et al. 1996). These
studies usually focus on the different characteristics of international governments and
their impact on the social movement within their country (Kitschelt 1995; Kriesi et al.
1995).
One problem with the concept of political opportunity structure is that social
movement scholars frequently disagree on its definition. It is often defined too broadly
and it is sometimes used as a catch-all. It has been applied to the political structure as
well as almost any feature of a social movement’s environment including cultural
changes. McAdam (1996) notes that although political and cultural aspects of the
environment can be closely related, changes in the political structure should not be
mistaken for cultural processes through which political elements are frequently framed.
In addition to issues of conceptual clarity, another problem exists. Political
opportunity structure has been confused with resource mobilization. Theorists have
maintained that political opportunities were resources to be used by social movements.
However, Jasper (1997) criticizes political process theorists who use the same label for
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both political opportunity structure and resource mobilization because these broad
definitions deprive each perspective of their clarity and explanatory value.

Beyond social movement theory: institutional politics
To understand why some states adopted woman suffrage while others did not, I begin by
drawing from institutional politics theory. Institutional politics theory integrates
concepts from institutional and political theories of social policy. Amenta and Halfmann
(2000) use institutional politics theory to comprehend differences in social spending in
states at the end of the New Deal (see also Amenta 1998; Amenta and Poulsen 1996). I
apply aspects of institutional politics theory that relate directly to state law-making:
democratization, reform-oriented regimes, and the social movement’s political presence.

Democratization
Amenta and Halfmann (2000) describe a democratized polity as one with high levels of
political participation. Political participation is characterized by greater voting rights.
Amenta and Poulsen (1996) find that spending on Old-Age Assistance pensions is
influenced by increased voting rights. I expect that democratization also increases the
success of woman suffrage legislation. For my study I characterize democratization as
elements of political openness identified by Clemens (1997). Clemens demonstrates that
these elements–the initiative and referendum, the Australian ballot or the secret ballot,
and the mandatory direct primary (Clemens also includes woman suffrage as a measure
of political openness)–increased political participation by weakening party control,
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thereby permitting greater participation among the electorate. Clemens also shows that
these political innovations were widespread throughout the Western states.
I combine these elements as an index of democratization because they directly
impacted political participation by weakening traditional party ties and party control in
state law-making. The Australian ballot weakened party control by replacing party
ballots. The Australian ballot listed political candidates by the office for which they were
running, rather than listing candidates strictly by political party. Furthermore, the
Australian ballot was distributed by the local government. On the other hand, party
ballots listed all candidates from one party and were distributed by the party directly to
the voters. After receiving the ballots from the party, voters took the ballots to the polls
to cast their votes. The practice of using party ballots was often poorly regulated and
corrupt. Party ballots were intended to expedite straight party voting over selecting
particular candidates from the other party (Clemens 1997).
States’ use of mandatory direct primaries also increased voter participation.
Direct primaries allowed voters, not parties, to select political candidates in party
conventions. Prior to the implementation of direct primaries, party leadership selected
candidates thus limiting the electorates’ choices for political office (Merriam and
Overacher 1928).
The final element of political openness is the initiative and referendum. The
initiative and referendum increased democratization by allowing voters to amend the
constitution by completely bypassing the state legislature. This is carried out when a
percentage of voters petitions the government. The amount of signatures required is
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specified by each state’s constitution. When the requisite number of signatures is secured
the amendment is submitted to the electorate at the next general election (Ranney 1978).
In the end, two states granted woman suffrage via the initiative and referendum: Arizona
and Oregon, both in 1912. Since these elements gave voters more choices and more
chances to participate in the political process, I expect democratization to increase the
opportunities for women to participate in the political process. I expect that states with a
greater degree of democratization will be more successful passing woman suffrage
legislation.

Reform-oriented regimes
Institutional politics theory argues that reform-oriented regimes are more likely to
support social spending. Third parties are characteristic of reform-oriented regimes and
they generally supported more progressive social policy. Their presence increased social
spending at the time of the New Deal (Amenta and Halfmann 2000).
Third parties were also generally more supportive of woman suffrage. Following
the lead of previous third parties, the Progressive Party was especially supportive of
woman suffrage and included it on their political platform in 1912, their first year in
existence. This resolution was an attempt to garner support for their presidential
candidate, Theodore Roosevelt, in the western states where women were already
enfranchised (Wolbrect 2000). The Progressive party’s platform spurred woman suffrage
debates in other states as well. Edwards (1997) contends that “the appearance of the new
Progressive Party played an influential role in a number of states. The momentum of
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state-level victories resurrected old debates within the suffrage movement” (165). Thus,
I expect the presence of third parties to increase the activity and success of woman
suffrage legislation.
Married women’s property rights as another indicator of a reform-oriented
regime. Before the passage of married women’s property rights, common law transferred
control of a woman’s property to her husband upon marriage. With the passage of
separate property rights women gained (to varying degrees depending on the state) the
right to own the property they brought to the marriage as well as the property and
earnings they acquired during their marriage (Conway et al. 1999). While wealthy
families often created special contracts or trusts to protect their property from a
prospective husband, common law was especially hard on middle- and lower-class
women who did not have the legal means to protect their property (Matsuda 1985). Kahn
(1996) also finds distinct regional differences between property rights acts passed by
states. She finds that despite the early success of many southern states which passed
property rights, they interpreted the statutes conservatively.
Beginning in 1838, states began to pass legislation to protect women’s property
from their husbands’ creditors (Zeigler 1996). The intent of these laws was to secure the
property of a married woman from her husband’s creditors to protect family assets during
economic problems, especially the economic downturn of the late 1830s (Kahn 1996).
Although these changes marked the beginning of legislation to protect married women’s
property rights, the statutes were often narrowly defined and ambiguous, leaving the
courts freedom for interpretation (Chused 1985). Methods used by judges to limit the
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rights of wives included refusal to apply new statutes to property rights acquired before
the passage of the statute, limiting contractual powers of women, resolving conflicts in
the rights of husband and wife in favor of the husband, and maintaining that property acts
did not include property purchased with the earnings of married women. Married
women’s property rights acts often resulted in continued inequality. As a result, I focus
on feme sole or sole trader rights. Sole trader rights granted married women the right to
engage in business on the same basis as single women. Sole trader rights include the
right to make contractual agreements and file law suits (Kahn 1996). In my view, states
that granted sole trader rights is an indication that a state legislature is more sympathetic
to progressive feminist legislation. Granting sole trader rights demonstrates a propensity
to reform prevailing political measures. I expect that states passing sole trader rights will
be more likely to pass woman suffrage legislation.

Political presence
The third aspect of institutional politics theory I draw from is political presence. Amenta
(1998) argues that social policy advocates gain support by establishing a presence in the
political arena. When this occurs, states are more inclined to increase social spending.
Other scholars also emphasize the importance of support for a social movement in the
political arena (see McAdam 1996; Tarrow 1998). In my study I consider whether or not
woman suffrage was endorsed by either the Democratic or Republican parties. I expect
support by either party to be more important to legislative success than which particular
political party supported suffrage.
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Beyond institutional politics: organizational characteristics
In institutional politics theory the political structure and the party system are crucial for
explaining social policy outcomes. However, institutional politics theory does not
adequately identify structural constraints or internal organizational characteristics that
restrain legislative success. For that reason, this study goes one step further than past
studies of woman suffrage by analyzing the impact of organizational characteristics of
state government on legislative success. Consistent with Chaves’ (1997) findings that
internal organizational dynamics were crucial to the timing of changes in the Catholic
church, analyzing organizational characteristics of state government should reveal
specific structural characteristics that influenced early suffrage adoption in the
Intermountain West.
Gorden Bakken (1987) discusses the distinct structural characteristics of state
governments in the Intermountain West. According to Bakken, constitutional convention
delegates who had the task of creating constitutions for Rocky Mountain states were
concerned with the scope of power of the new state legislatures. The constitutions and
legislative procedures reflected their sentiments. For example, Wyoming addressed the
issue of limiting legislative power in their debates regarding legislative apportionment.
Liberals argued that apportionment should be based on population to give legislative
power to the people and not to the “economic interests.” Conversely, cattle ranchers and
others from counties dominated by cattle interests, argued that representatives should be
apportioned according to county lines. This debate illustrates one way that the newly
formed states in the West sought to break with past political conventions and create a
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stronger tie between popular sentiment and legislation. As a result, suffragists faced
fewer institutional constraints in newly formed states in the West.
Another organizational characteristic, state founding date, is also related to
woman suffrage success. States achieving statehood in earlier years were less likely to
pass woman suffrage. Table 4 compares states that achieved statehood from 1776 to
1925 and whether they granted full suffrage to women. Overall, the proportion of
suffrage success increased in states founded in later time periods. In the first time period,
only one state, New York, eventually passed woman suffrage. None of the states
founded during the next time period granted woman suffrage. The proportion of states
that passed suffrage increased during the remaining time periods through 1876-1901.
During the final time period, New Mexico was the only state that did not pass full
suffrage. However, New Mexico did pass partial suffrage the year it achieved statehood
in 1912.
One reason New Mexico’s did not grant full suffrage to women was that its
requirements for constitution revision were especially difficult. New Mexico’s 1912
constitution specified that woman suffrage could only be granted by three-fourths
majority vote in each house of the legislature. The proposal needed to carry a threefourths majority at a state-held referendum with a two thirds majority of those voting in
each county. These provisions were more stringent for woman suffrage than for other
constitutional amendments in New Mexico. These requirements were designed to
prevent Spanish speakers, who had traditionally held positions of importance in the
government, from losing political power.
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Imprinting
Organizational imprinting describes the impact of environmental conditions during
particular time periods on newly formed organizations. Specifically, imprinting is the
idea that conditions at the time of founding are reflected in an organization’s structure.
According to Stinchcome (1965) organizations founded during the same time period are
typically similar in form. An organization’s environment at one point in time provides
certain resources and political constraints which imprint organizations and these
conditions have a lasting effect on organizations ( Hannan and Freeman 1989; Meyer and
Rowan 1977; Scott 1992).
Organizational imprinting provides a framework for understanding the timing of
woman suffrage adoption in states founded during different time periods. Imprinting
effects are illustrated in Table 4. Governments founded in similar time periods exhibit
similar structural patterns concerning the adoption of woman suffrage. The effects of
imprinting are exhibited by the differences in the timing of woman suffrage adoption by
state governments.
Which conditions were imprinted in the newly formed western states that made
them receptive to changes concerning citizenship? Before answering this question it is
necessary to describe the environmental processes that constrain organizations generally,
and state governments specifically. Scott (1992) delineates two types of environments:
technical and institutional. Technical environments are characterized by markets that
exchange products or services produced by organizations which are compensated for
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their efficiency. On the other hand, institutional environments support organizations
through rules and regulations to which the organizations must comply. Institutional
environments exist for economic organizations but are more prevalent for political
organizations. Political organizations, including state governments, are subject to voter
preferences and fiscal limitations; but the most stringent constraints come from already
established laws concerning citizens’ rights (March and Olsen 1999).

Federalism
Federalism is one way in which state governments were imprinted. Although there are
many different definitions of federalism (Gray and Eisinger 1991), Elazar (1984) defines
federalism as “the mode of political organization that unites separate polities within an
overarching political system by distributing power among general and constituent
governments in a manner designed to protect the existence and authority of both” (2).
Elazar points out that federalism ties state and federal government to one another. Both
are required to share in the creation of and in the implementation of laws, and power is
diffused between them as they share in political activities. Federalism requires state and
federal polities to be interdependent while simultaneously allowing enough autonomy to
maintain separate identities as policy-making institutions.
In the case of woman suffrage, the federal government provided a political
environment for and imprinted newly formed states and territories. Since states had to
petition Congress for admittance into the Union, state constitutions needed to conform to
federal policy and to other conditions mandated by Congress. Conformity to federal laws
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by territorial governments was expedient or admission to the Union was denied.
Federalism illustrates the interdependent relationship between state and federal
government and also explains the timing of woman suffrage activity in state legislatures.
For instance, in 1869, Senator Young proposed a joint resolution recommending the U. S.
constitution be amended to extend suffrage to women. The reasoning was “that while the
Constitution of the United States is being amended, extending the right of suffrage to all
men over twenty-one years of age, that the same right be granted, at least, to all women
over twenty-one years of age. . . .” (Journal of the Senate for the State of West Virginia
1869: 56). At this time, Congress was taking up the issue of enfranchising black men and
the federal amendment granting the vote to black men was ratified in 1870. The
language and reasoning used by Senator Young illustrates the impact of federal policy on
state policy, despite the absence of a direct mandate by the federal government to which
state governments needed to conform.
After the Civil War boundaries concerning citizenship, previously limited to
white men, expanded. The Fifteenth Amendment, ratified February 7, 1870, provided
that citizens should not be precluded from voting on account of race and provided
universal suffrage to men. These changes in the definition and boundaries of citizenship
at the federal level provided a political context for states founded in the West during and
after this time period. The federal renegotiation of boundaries in citizenship are
reflected in the discussion and adoption of woman suffrage and underscores the
importance of organizational imprinting. The implication for this study is that political

22

conditions present at the founding of newly formed states will be reflected in their
structure.
It is no coincidence that Wyoming Territory was admitted to the Union in 1868
and passed suffrage one year later in light of the environment in which it was founded.
Wyoming Territory was influenced by the Civil War amendments which expanded
citizenship and citizens’ rights to black males. It was a natural leap to extend the
discussion of voting rights to women, especially since many women advocating woman
suffrage were heavily involved in the abolition movement in an attempt to secure the
franchise for blacks and themselves (Banaszak 1996). Coupled with the previous
discussion of territorial governments as arenas of political experimentation, federalism
provides an explanation for the timing of the enfranchisement of woman suffrage in the
Wyoming Territory.
The concept of imprinting demands attention to historical time period. States
founded after the Civil War amendments should reflect changes concerning citizenship in
the political landscape. Consequently, I expect states founded after the Civil War
amendments to be more likely to pass woman suffrage legislation.

Structural inertia
Structural inertia holds important implications for political innovation and for the
adoption of woman suffrage. Structural inertia is defined by Hannan and Carroll (1995)
as resistence to change. Since organizational resources are absorbed by facilities,
personnel, equipment, training, and costs of gathering and distributing information,
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changing organizational structures and procedures involves time and money. Innovation
is not only difficult, but reform efforts often fail. Despite tremendous effort and
legislative activity, the suffrage movement in Iowa demonstrates the difficulty with
which change is achieved. Iowa’s state legislature introduced 42 full suffrage bills, more
than any other state. Yet, Iowa did not grant woman suffrage.
The implications of structural inertia for state legislatures are obvious. States in
existence for longer periods of time will exhibit greater procedural constraints and less
policy innovation. Organizational learning processes, which encode “inferences from
history into routines that guide behavior,” shape an organization’s future by encouraging
the homogenization of procedures and organizational action (March and Levitt 1999: 75).
As an organization gains experience, learning processes tend to be self-limiting. That is,
learning reduces diversity of beliefs and behavior and it reduces variation in performance
resulting in the institutionalization of procedures (Levinthal 1991). Through learning
processes, procedures become informally and formally inscribed; informally through
social norms and formally through manuals, goals, and reports. Although change is often
prompted by changes in the environment, the organization’s structure mediates future
environmental uncertainty. And political institutions are no different. As in the case of
Iowa, the legislative bodies of older states will be less able to respond to cultural changes
and popular opinion. I surmise that older states will be less effective passing woman
suffrage legislation and that newer states will be more successful introducing, voting on,
and passing woman suffrage bills.
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Although my expectations are similar concerning structural inertia and the
previous discussion of organizational imprinting (i.e., that new states are more likely to
pass suffrage legislation), these organizational processes are conceptually disparate and
they are measured differently. Inertia describes the propensity to change as a function of
the newness of the state. Imprinting, on the other hand, pertains to the time period in
which the state was founded. That is, different time periods produce different
organizational forms.

Organizational size
The third organizational characteristic of state governments I examine is organizational
size. Scott (1992) reports that organizational structure tends to become more complex
over time, especially as its tasks and size increase. As organizational size increases and
tasks become more complex, coordination problems arise (Blau 1970; Blau 1972; Hall
1999; Scott 1992). It follows that larger state legislatures will more constrained by
coordination problems.
Most scholars who study organizational size and structure emphasize the effect of
the number of employees. However, as Scott (1992) points out, using the number of
employees as a variable has disadvantages. First, the boundaries between participants
and non-participants of organizations are often difficult to determine. Second,
participants differ from one another in the intensity of their work. This is problematic
when studying participants among different types of organizations because making
comparisons is difficult. However, the disadvantages of using the number of
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organizational participants cited by Scott are negligible when examining state
governments since it is easy to determine the number of legislators from the legislative
journals and from other sources. In addition, my study does not deal with different types
of organizations.
Based on the conclusions of Scott (1992), that organizational structure becomes
more complex over time, smaller state legislatures of the West should be more amenable
to change and less constrained by problems of communication and coordination. It
seems more likely that a handful of legislators advocating woman suffrage would be
more successful in smaller states. Therefore, I expect legislative success in states with
smaller state legislatures.

Mimetic isomorphism
One challenge facing any organization is environmental change and uncertainty.
Although organizational fields (groups of interrelated organizations such as suppliers,
buyers, and regulatory agencies) show remarkable diversity early on, Dimaggio and
Powell (1983) argue that well-established organizational fields are characterized by
organizations that copy procedures and outcomes. Organizations often innovate by
copying rules and procedures of other organizations and they are often motivated to
imitate in order to improve their efficiency.
Dimaggio and Powell identify three types of institutional isomorphism which
occur as organizations seek cultural and political legitimacy: mimetic, coercive, and
normative. In my study I focus on mimetic isomorphism as a relevant practice of state
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legislatures. Mimetic isomorphism occurs amidst high levels of uncertainty and
ambiguity. When dealing with problems of ambiguity, organizations seek legitimate
solutions despite “any concrete evidence that the adopted models enhance efficiency”
(70).
Mimicry is a common practice among state legislatures. Walker (1969) maintains
that states look to other states for direction in legislative matters. Often, state
governments imitate others who have successfully taken the lead in legislative matters.
For example, the 1911 legislative handbook for New Mexico contains a summary of the
various voter qualifications in other states. Walker also finds that regional clustering
occurs. Some states act as regional leaders while others only follow after the leaders
have enacted the legislation. As a result, I expect mimetic processes to influence woman
suffrage legislation and success. As more states within a particular region adopt suffrage,
other states will be more likely to follow.

Legislative process
The legislative process varies by state and each bill has to pass many stages to make its
way through the legislature. First, a bill needs to be introduced by a legislator who is
willing to sponsor it. After a bill is introduced in either house it is sent to a committee.
Committees can impede a bill’s progress by recommending that a bill not pass, by taking
no action, by discussing the bill for an inordinate amount of time, or by sending it to
another committee altogether. For example, a full woman suffrage bill, introduced New
York in 1892, was referred to the committee on the judiciary and no action was taken.
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The bill died in committee. Another bill, introduced in New York in 1878, was reported
to the committee on the judiciary and received a favorable recommendation.
Nevertheless, it was sent to another committee, the committee on the whole, and no
further action was taken. It should be noted that if a bill does not receive a favorable
recommendation by the committee, the bill can still be voted on.
After a bill is reported by the committee, it is read a second and third time before
it is voted on. At this stage a bill can also be tabled; meaning it will not be considered
further. When a bill is voted on it must pass by a constitutional majority. This varies by
states and is stipulated in the state constitution. A constitutional majority consist of votes
in the affirmative by one half, two thirds, three fifths, or sometimes three fourths. After
one of the houses passes a bill it is sent to the other house where it is required to undergo
through the entire process again in order to pass. Some state constitutions, such as
Nevada’s, specified that bills must pass two consecutive legislative sessions. In fact,
Nevada’s legislature passed woman suffrage bills on three different occasions (1869,
1883, and 1895) but the bills did not pass a second session and they were required to
begin the process anew. Once a bill passes both houses it is either signed or vetoed by
the governor. If the bill is signed by the governor, it is required to be ratified in a
referendum in which the electorate votes on whether or not the bill should become law.
Another aspect of the legislative process that influenced bill success is the frequency with
which legislative sessions are held. Some state legislatures met yearly but others met less
frequently, every other year. States which required two consecutive legislatures to pass a
bill may also be less likely to pass a bill.
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The legislative process is arduous and its multiple stages can hinder legislative
success. I expect that states with more stringent legislative requirements–larger
constitutional majorities and requiring two consecutive legislatures–will obstruct the
success of woman suffrage bills. I expect that the frequency with which the legislature
meets will also influence the legislative outcome. Increased time between legislative
sessions should allow additional time for obstacles to arise. More obstacles might
include problems concerning coordination required to maintain support for suffrage
legislation and also procedural problems which could impede the success of suffrage
initiatives. Therefore, legislatures that meet more often should be more successful
passing woman suffrage bills.

Legislative outcome
Considering the difficulty of the legislative process and its importance to the timing of
woman suffrage success, I measure the effects of institutional politics theory and
organizational characteristics on different stages of the legislative process. I do this by
examining outcomes at various stages in the legislative process. The legislative stages
that I examine are (1) whether or not a bill was introduced in the house or in the senate,
(2) whether or not a bill was voted on in the house or in the senate, and (3) whether or not
a bill was passed in the house or in the senate.

Summary and hypotheses
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This study uses data from state governments to understand why woman suffrage was first
adopted in western states even though most of the movement’s resources were in the
East. To determine the effect of state building on the adoption of woman suffrage I draw
from institutional politics theory by looking at party support, the presence of third parties,
and political openness. I also draw from organizational theory by examining the
processes imprinting, structural inertia, and organizational size, mimetic isomorphism,
and the legislative process.
Since no literature exists on legislative success at various stages, I hypothesize
that the effects of institutional politics and organizational characteristics will effect each
stage of the legislative process. The following are the formally stated hypotheses:
H1: More democratized states increase the likelihood that woman suffrage legislation is
introduced, voted on, and passed.
H2: States with a larger number of political parties are more likely to introduce, vote on,
and pass suffrage legislation.
H3: States in which woman suffrage has a greater political presence (party endorsement
of woman suffrage and sole trader rights) have a greater probability of introducing,
voting on, and passing suffrage legislation.
H4: States founded after the Civil War Amendments (1870) are more likely to introduce,
vote on, and pass suffrage legislation.
H5: States with greater structural inertia are less likely to introduce, vote on, and pass
suffrage legislation.
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H6: States with fewer legislators are more likely to introduce, vote on, and pass suffrage
legislation.
H7: States in regions with states that have passed woman suffrage are more likely to
introduce, vote on, and pass suffrage legislation.
H8: States with greater legislative constraints–larger constitutional majorities, require
two consecutive sessions, and met less often–are less likely to introduce, vote on, and
pass suffrage legislation.
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Chapter 2 – Method

This study examines state-level panel data to determine the impact of state
government on legislative outcome. The population under investigation includes all 45
states in which state legislatures could amend their constitutions between 1848 and 1918.
The advantage of studying a population is that a population, versus a sample, justifies
interpretation of coefficients regardless of statistical significance. Nevertheless,
statistical significance is preferred to demonstrate the more stable effects and also to
emphasize which variables are generalizable.
Three of the contiguous states are excluded from this study: Utah, Wyoming, and
New Hampshire. Utah and Wyoming are omitted because woman suffrage was included
in their first state constitutions. In Utah and Wyoming, woman suffrage was proposed in
a constitutional convention and was approved by the electorate prior to statehood. New
Hampshire is excluded because their state constitution prevented the legislature from
amending the constitution. Their constitution could only be amended through a
constitutional convention. Several states’ constitutions similarly prevented the
legislature from amending the constitution in various years. These include Florida from
1865 to 1867, Indiana from 1848 to 1856, Iowa from 1848 to 1856, Kentucky from 1848
to 1890, Nebraska from 1867 to 1874, Ohio from 1848 to 1850, and Virginia from 1848
to 1869. These states’ years are also omitted from the analysis. Otherwise, states are
included beginning in 1848 or year of statehood. States are right censored when they
successfully amended their constitution to include woman suffrage or after the year 1918.
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The analysis begins in 1848 since this is the year of the Seneca Falls Convention.
The Seneca Falls Convention is most often identified as the beginning of the feminist
movement in the United States. 1918 is the last year of the analysis since Congress
passed the Nineteenth Amendment in 1919, and state legislatures began voting on the
Federal Amendment at this time. The passing of the Nineteenth Amendment would have
biased state legislative action on woman suffrage legislation and also resulted in several
state suffrage campaigns that only focused on the Federal Amendment.

Data
Many studies of woman suffrage examine the movement from the perspective of the
eastern United States. This is a result of the data that are available. Most scholars use
the six-volume History of Woman Suffrage (Stanton et al. 1881) for information
concerning the woman suffrage movement. Unfortunately, Stanton et al. primarily focus
on the national movement. Their sources of information about state suffrage campaigns
are provided mainly by women affiliated with the NAWSA. Information concerning
suffrage activities independent of the NAWSA may or may not be included in this record.
Additionally, affiliations to the NAWSA were not as strong in the West as they were in
the East and not all suffragists were associated with the NAWSA (Beeton 1986). In fact,
Abigail Dunaway, the most prominent suffragist in the Pacific Northeast, refused to be
affiliated with the national organization (Duniway 1971). As a result of these biases,
Stanton et al. underestimate suffrage activity in the West. For instance, only 473 of the
total 5,555 pages of the History of Woman Suffrage volumes are dedicated to the
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movement in the western states (Schiffman 1998). In addition, information reported by
Stanton et al. concerning many of the western states, especially concerning legislation, is
incomplete and sometimes inaccurate.
For complete information I use data that I gathered with Professor Cornwall, Dr.
Torres, Kendra Schiffman, and Brayden King on woman suffrage legislation. This
research was funded by two grants from the National Science Foundation. The data on
woman suffrage legislation was gathered from state libraries and archives. At state
libraries we consulted legislative records (House and Senate journals) and found every
full suffrage bill that was introduced prior to 1919. Each bill was coded by state, year,
whether it was considered in the house or the senate, the date it was introduced in either
house, by whom it was introduced, the date it was referred to committee, the date it was
voted on in either house, whether or not it passed either house, and the number of votes
for and against the bill. After a bill passed one house the same information was coded for
the other house as it went through the same process. On some occasions the house and
senate journals were not indexed. In these instances the process of finding bills included
using clues from secondary sources such as dates that bills were introduced, voted on,
passed, and legislators who were mentioned that introduced bills and then we searched
page by page for the woman suffrage legislation.
Information on state structure was collected by consulting state constitutions,
statutes, secondary sources, the Office of the Secretary of State for many states, and state
librarians and archivists. I was assisted in this process by other research assistants, Bruce
Lott and Liz Mykla. To find the years in which elements of democratization were

34

granted I began with Clemens (1997) and the sources she cites concerning elements of
political openness (see Heckelman 1995; Kettleborough 1923; Merriam and Overacker
1928; Ranney 1978). These sources provided data for states until 1913. To find the
years for the remaining states I looked through their statutes and constitutions. To find
the years in which sole trader rights were granted, I began with Kahn (1996). Her data
provided years for states in which sole trader rights were granted until 1900. To find the
remaining states I again consulted statutes and constitutions.
Another aspect of state structure is the number of state legislators in each state by
decade. This was gathered by contacting every Office of the Secretary of State (or state
librarian or archivist) in the contiguous U. S. via email or phone. Most of them emailed,
faxed, or mailed the desired information. Information for the remaining states were
found by searching state histories, Blue Books, and state constitutions. Data concerning
the legislative process were collected by searching every new state constitution during
the time period of this study. From state constitutions I identified changes in the
proportion of legislators required to pass a bill in the House and in the Senate, the
number of sessions required to pass a bill before it could be submitted to the electorate
for approval, and the frequency with which sessions were held (see Table 5).
Information concerning political parties were collected from Gubernatorial
Elections, 1787-1987 (1998). This source includes votes for gubernatorial candidates
from all parties receiving at least five percent of the vote cast in an election. I also use
one variable, party support, from McCammon and Campbell (2001).
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Dependent variable: legislative outcome
There are three dependent binary variables in this analysis. The first variable is coded 0
or 1 indicating whether or not a woman suffrage bill was introduced in a legislative
session in either the House or in the Senate (n=516). The second variable is coded 0 or 1
indicating whether or not a woman suffrage bill was voted on in a legislative session in
either the House or in the Senate (n=236). The third variable is coded 0 or 1 indicating
whether or not a woman suffrage bill was passed in a legislative session in either the
House or in the Senate (n=126). Only full woman suffrage bills are included in this
analysis. Full suffrage bills enfranchised all women in a state as opposed to partial
suffrage bills that grant suffrage in certain matters: school elections, presidential
elections, primary elections, etc. Table 6 shows the distribution of legislative sessions in
which a full woman suffrage bill was introduced, voted on, and passed by decade from
1848-1918. Because other studies may report different numbers of full suffrage bills, it
should be noted that I do not include territorial suffrage bills (n=49). In addition, my
analysis counts the sessions in which a bill was introduced, voted on, or passed; not the
total number of bills by outcome. In other words, I do not count the number of bills in a
legislative session. I only count whether or not a bill was introduced, voted on, or
passed.

Independent variables
Four variables measure aspects of institutional politics. First, democratization is an
index indicating the number of elements of progressive politics that a state has adopted
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for any given year. These elements are the constitutional initiative and referendum, the
Australian ballot, and the mandatory direct primary. Second, total parties is the number
of political parties represented in a gubernatorial election (up to four). This variable was
created by coding elections in which one party’s gubernatorial candidate received 85
percent or more of the vote as one party. Elections in which two candidates received
votes were coded as two parties. Elections in which three or four candidates received
votes were coded as three and four parties respectively. For the years in which there was
no gubernatorial election the number is attained from the last election that took place.
Third, party support measures political presence and is a dichotomous variable, coded 1
or 0, indicating whether or not woman suffrage was included in a Democratic or
Republican party platform for any given year. One problem with this variable is that it
begins in 1866. Nevertheless, it is probable that woman suffrage was not endorsed by the
Republican or Democratic parties before this date since it was not a prominent political
issue for politicians prior to the Civil War. According to the data the first year that a
party endorsed suffrage was in Ohio in 1873. Fourth, sole trader rights also measures
political presence and is a dichotomous variable. It is coded 1 after sole trader rights
have been passed in a state and 0 for the years that they have not been passed.
I use five variables to measure organization characteristics. Imprinting is a
dichotomous variable, coded 1 or 0, indicating whether or not a state was founded in
1870 or later; after the Civil War Amendments were passed. Structural inertia is the age
of the state. Organizational size is the total number of legislators in the state legislators.
Mimetic isomorphism is the number of states in the same region that adopted woman
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suffrage. The regions are based on the geographic regions utilized by Elazar (1984). I
measure legislative process by using three different three variables. First, constitutional
majority is the proportion of legislators required to pass a bill. Second, sessions required
is the number of legislative sessions required to pass a bill. Third, session frequency is
the frequency (measured in years) with which a legislature meets. Table 7 shows the
means and standard deviations of the independent variables.
I use a random-effects regression model for binary data (Maximum Likelihood
Estimation). The model is formally stated as
yit = xNit $ + "i + eit
where yit is the binary probability of an event for the ith individual and the tth wave. The
expression xNit ß indicates the index function, “where $ = ($0, . . . , $K)N is the K + 1
column vector of regression coefficents.” The unit-specific effects (the unobserved
heterogeneity) are expressed by "i and xNit = (xit0, . . . , xitK) is the K + 1 row vector of
independent variables corresponding to the ith individual and the tth wave. The error
term, eit, represents the time-varying stochastic error. These “are assumed to be normally
distributed with mean zero. . . .” Additionally, the error term is assumed to be
uncorrelated the independent variables and with "i (Powers and Xie 2000, pp. 60, 183).
All statistical analyses are performed using Intercooled Stata Version 7 (StataCorp
2001b).
I use three models in my analysis. Each model represents a stage in the
legislative process: whether or not a bill was introduced in either house, whether or not a
bill was voted on in either house, and whether or not a bill was passed in either house.
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Since bills in each stage are conditional on and are a subset of the previous outcome, I
use a sequential logit model (Mare 1980; Powers and Xie 2000). For instance, in the first
stage I model the log odds of a bill being introduced for the years in which a legislative
session was held. In the second stage, I model the log odds of a bill being voted on only
in sessions in which a bill was introduced. This is accomplished by selecting only the
sessions in which a legislature introduced a bill. In the third stage, I model the log odds
of a bill being passed in the instances in which a bill was voted on. This is accomplished
by selecting only the sessions in which a legislature voted on a bill. I report the log odds
for all of the independent variables. In order to emphasize the findings that are
generalizable to other populations, I report the probabilities for only the significant
independent variables.
The log odds can be interpreted as odds ratios or probabilities. I calculated the
probabilities using an algorithm employed by Powers and Xie (2000). The baseline
probability is calculated by first multiplying the log odds of the random-effects logistic
regression model and the mean for each independent variable. The dummy variables are
multiplied by their mean. This is done to prevent the baseline models from being equal
when the dummy variables are set at zero. Next, the log odds of the constant is
multiplied by one. The products, consisting of the log odds multiplied by the mean, for
each independent variable and for the constant are summed. The baseline probability is
determined by dividing the exponent of the sum by 1 + the exponent of the sum. This is
formally stated as
exp ($0) / [1 + exp ($0)
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The probability for an independent variable at any given value is calculated by
first multiplying the log odds by that value instead of by the mean. Then, holding all
other independent variables constant at their mean and multiplying the log odds of the
constant by one, the products for each independent variable and for the constant are
summed. As in the baseline probability, the exponent of the sum is divided by 1 + the
exponent of the sum.
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Chapter 3 – Results

From 1848 to 1918, 516 legislative sessions introduced a woman suffrage bill in
either house, 236 sessions voted on a bill, and 126 sessions passed a bill. Suffrage bills
that were introduced in either house had a 46 percent chance of being voted on (236 out
of 516). Of these, 53 percent were passed (126 out of 516). The overall success rate was
25 percent (126 out of 516). The Senate, which is generally considered the more
conservative legislative body, was 10 percent more successful passing bills than the
House (Table 6).
The sessions that were held between 1910 and 1918 introduced 40 percent of all
woman suffrage bills. This finding emphasizes the increasing activity in suffrage
legislation. It also shows the effectiveness of early adopters since fewer bills were
introduced in the earlier decades. It is important to note the decline in suffrage activity
from 1900 to 1910. This decade is known as the “doldrums” in the woman suffrage
literature because no states granted suffrage. The doldrums were a backlash following
the success of the prior decade.
A correlation matrix reveals that several independent variables are moderately
correlated (Table 8). The strongest correlation is between structural inertia and
democratization (0.491). This is a function of time since both increase as year increases.
Structural inertia and legislative size are also correlated (0.424). These variables are
correlated because newer western states had smaller legislatures while state legislatures
in the East were generally larger. In addition, imprinting and structural inertia are
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negatively correlated (-0.392) as are session frequency and sessions required (-0.368).
These correlations are also a function of time. Sole trader and democratization are
correlated (0.344). This stands to reason since more democratized states passed sole
trader rights.
For each legislative stage a separate model is run for each group of
variables–institutional politics and organizational characteristics. In the first model I
estimate the log odds of institutional politics and in the second model I estimate the log
odds of organizational characteristics. The third model combines all of the variables
from both groups. By analyzing the effects of the groups of variables separately in the
initial models and by comparing them to the third model, I can determine whether one
group of variables has an effect on the size and sign of the coefficients in the other group.
In the fourth model I drop the insignificant variables in order to emphasize the most
important variables and also for parsimony. I report the effects of all independent
variables since the data come from the population of state legislatures that are capable of
amending their constitutions. However, I report and interpret only the probabilities for
the significant variables to emphasize the more stable and the generalizable effects. In all
of the models I control for temporal effects by including year as an independent variable.

Bill introduced
Table 9 shows the log odds of the independent variables for whether not a woman
suffrage bill is introduced in a legislative session. In each model the effect of year is
positive and significant. Holding the other variables constant at their mean, the
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probability of introducing a bill in 1854 (the first year in which a full suffrage bill was
introduced) is almost one half of one percent while the probability of introducing a bill in
1918 is 43% (Table 12). This is one of the strongest effects in the model and indicates
that bills are more likely to be introduced over time.
Three institutional politics variables are significant. Democratization is
significant but the coefficient is negative. This finding is surprising and indicates that
democratized states are less likely to introduce a woman suffrage bill. However, the
effect is small. The probability of introducing a bill decreases from 8% for a state that
has not passed any element of political openness to 5%, 3%, and 2% as states pass one,
two, or three elements respectively. Democratization is positively correlated with
structural inertia meaning that newer western states were more democratized. This
suggests that more democratized states introduced fewer bills because the they were more
efficient in the legislative process. These states ended up needing fewer legislative
sessions to pass suffrage which is the case in the Intermountain West. The effects of sole
trader rights are negative and nonsignificant.
The positive, significant coefficient for total parties indicates that the presence of
third parties increased bill introduction. Nonetheless, the effect is small. The probability
of bill introduction increases from 4% in states represented by two parties in the prior
gubernatorial election to 10% when four parties were represented. The effect of party
support is also significant and positive. The significant and positive effect shows, as
predicted, that woman suffrage bills are more likely to be introduced in years in which
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the Democratic or Republican party supports woman suffrage in its political campaign.
Party support more than doubles the probability of bill introduction from 4% to 11%.
Of the organizational characteristics, imprinting, the number of legislative
sessions required to pass an amendment, and the frequency of legislative sessions are not
significant. The other legislative variable, constitutional majority, is negative and
significant. Therefore, states with smaller constitutional majorities were more likely to
introduce bills. The probability that a state requiring a one-half majority as opposed to a
two-thirds majority slightly increases the probability of bill introduction from 3% to 7%.
The other organizational variables are statistically significant and their impact
confirms my hypotheses. Structural inertia’s negative coefficient indicates that younger
states were more likely to introduce suffrage bills. An increase in structural inertia from
its value at the 25th percentile (38 years) to its value at the 75th percentile (94 years)
decreases the probability of introducing a bill from 5% to 3%. However, the size of this
effect is negligible. The positive effects of organizational size and mimetic isomorphism
indicate that larger state legislatures and more states in the region with suffrage increase
the likelihood that a state will introduce a woman suffrage bill. The change in probability
for organizational size at the 25th percentile (103 legislators) to the 75th percentile (173
legislators) is minimal. It increases from 4% to 5%. The probability of a bill being
introduced increases from 5% to 32% when the number of states in the region with
woman suffrage increases from zero to four states. States requiring a larger
constitutional majority slightly decreases the likelihood of introducing a bill from 8% to
3%.
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The rho statistic is used to ensure that the model is properly specified by
comparing the “pooled estimator (logit) with the panel estimator” (StataCorp 2001a:
380). If rho is significantly different from zero, a random-effects model is properly
specified. The rho statistic in Table 9 is significantly different from zero for each model.
In sum, mimetic isomorphism has the greatest effect on bill introduction. The
other significant institutional politics variables and organizational variables have only a
slight impact. Despite the small effects of most of the variables, the direction of the
effects of total parties, party support, inertia, and mimetic isomorphism confirm my
hypotheses. My hypotheses concerning democratization and organizational size were not
confirmed.

Bill voted
Table 10 lists the log odds for the models in the next stage of the legislative process. It is
important to note the number of cases decreases from the previous model, 1683 to 347.
The models in Table 10 are a subset of the models in Table 9. The number of cases
decrease since a bill could only be voted on in sessions in which a bill was introduced.
347 is the number of sessions in which a bill was introduced and then voted on in either
the House or Senate.
As expected, the significant institutional politics variables, sole trader, total
parties, and party support, have a positive effect. These findings show that states
granting sole trader rights are more likely to vote on a suffrage bill. After a state passes
sole trader rights the probability of voting on a bill increases a considerable extent, from
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34% to 62%. States in which more parties are represented in gubernatorial elections also
increases the likelihood of voting on a bill. When the number of total parties represented
increases from two to four, the probability of voting on a bill increases moderately from
53% to 65%. The last significant institutional politics variable, party support, increases
the probability of voting on a bill when the bill is endorsed by a political party. The
probability increases from 49% to 70%; a relatively strong effect. The other institutional
politics variable, democratization, is positive though nonsignificant.
Of the organizational characteristics, imprinting is not significant and it is
negative. The findings concerning structural inertia are similarly nonsignificant but
organizational size is significant. States with smaller legislatures are more likely to vote
on a bill. An increase in the legislative size from the 25th percentile to the 75th percentile
decreases the probability of voting on a bill from 61% to 51%. The effects of mimetic
isomophism and constitutional majority are positive but not significant.
The last two variables, sessions required and session frequency, are positive and
significant. These findings indicate that an increased number of session required to pass
a bill increases the likelihood that a bill will be voted on. An increase in the number of
sessions required from one to two increases the probability of voting on a bill from 40%
to 70%. This is a large effect but does not support the idea that more stringent legislative
procedures reduce the likelihood of voting on a bill. As for session frequency, the less
often a legislative session is held, the less likely a bill will be voted on. The probability
of bills being voted on increases from 38%, if sessions are held every year, to 63%, if
sessions are held every other year.
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The rho statistic is not significant. This means that the time variant heterogeneity
of the overall model is not significantly different from zero. This is likely a result of the
decline in the number of cases.
To summarize, the large effects for sole trader, total parties, and party support
indicate that institutional politics are more important for voting on a bill than for
introducing a bill. The effects of sole trader and party support become substantial while
the effects of total parties are modest. Compared with the last stage mimetic
isomorphism becomes less important. The only significant organizational variables are
organizational size, sessions required, and session frequency. Organizational size has a
slight effect, but sessions required and session frequency have large effects and are
important factors for whether or not a bill is considered. While the impact of institutional
politics was expected and its importance increased over the previous legislative stage, the
direction of the effects of sessions required and session frequency was unexpected.

Bill passed
Table 11 shows the log odds of the independent variables for passing a bill in at least one
house of the legislature. The cases decrease in number from the previous set of models
from 347 to 206. The cases decrease to include only the sessions in which a bill was
passed in at least one house as a subset of sessions in which a bill was voted on.
In this stage democratization is positive and significant. As democratization
increases, state legislatures are more likely to pass suffrage bills. The probability of a
state legislature passing a bill increases from 24% to 78% when the number of elements

47

of democratization increases from zero to three. This increase represents a tremendous
effect on the success of a suffrage bill. Sole trader becomes negative and nonsignificant.
The log odds of the other institutional politics variables are positive, significant, and have
substantial effects. An increase in total parties and party support increases the likelihood
that a bill will passed. These findings confirm my hypotheses. The probability that a bill
will be passed increases from 43% for a state represented by two parties to 89% for a
state represented by four parties. The probability of a bill passing in a state with party
support increases from 39% to 61%.
For the organizational variables, the effect of imprinting is positive but
insignificant. This effect is in the opposite direction for the models in Tables 10 and 11.
The significant negative effect of structural inertia shows, as predicted, that newer states
are more likely to pass a suffrage bill. The probability of passing a bill decreases from
62% percent for newer states with values in the 25th percentile to 33% for older states
with values in the 75th percentile. Compared with the first stage, this effect is
substantially larger. The log odds for organizational size and sessions required are
positive, though nonsignificant. The log odds for session frequency are negative and also
nonsignificant. As expected, constitutional majority is significant and decreases the
likelihood of passing a bill. An increase in constitutional majority from one half to two
thirds decreases the probability of a bill passing from 55% to 36%.
The rho statistic is not significantly different from zero. As in the previous
legislative stage, this is likely a result of the decline in the number of cases.
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Compared with the last two stages of the legislative process, the effects of the
significant variables have increased to a considerable extent. Democratization and total
parties were significant in Table 10 but their effects were minimal. However, their
effects have become noticeably larger in this stage. Party support, which was significant
in the preceding models, is a consistent predictor at each legislative stage with its effects
tripling between the first and second stages. Its effects remain constant between the
second and third stages. The effects of structural inertia on passing a bill substantially
increase compared with introducing a bill and its effects were not significant in the
previous stage. Similarly, constitutional majority was previously not significant but its
effect is large in this legislative stage.
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Chapter 4 – Discussion and conclusion

The results demonstrate the importance of examining characteristics of state
government at different legislative stages. Institutional politics are significant throughout
each stage but have the greatest impact on bills passing. The majority of organizational
characteristics are significant in the initial stage but only structural inertia is
consequential in the final stage. In addition, sessions required and session frequency are
important for whether or not a bill is voted on. The findings paint a picture of innovative
states that are smaller and newer, reside in regions granting suffrage, are more
democratic, have multiple parties vying for power, and have a party that endorses woman
suffrage. It is not surprising that these characteristics were widespread in the western
states.

Institutional politics
Democratization increases the likelihood of passing a bill, but has a negative effect on
introducing a bill. Although the latter finding is unexpected, the effects are minimal.
The former finding, however, supports my hypothesis and its effect is substantial.
Democratized states were more willing to increase voter participation by extending the
vote to women by passing woman suffrage legislation. This confirms Clemens’ (1997)
findings that western states were more democratic.
Sole trader rights is one indication of states’ support for women’s rights in
general. However, sole trader rights is only predictive in the voting stage. This suggests
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that sole trader rights were not necessarily an indication of gender equality in a state.
States granting sole trader rights were only more likely to consider the issue. In fact,
though the effect is not significant, sole trader rights had a negative impact on bill
introduction and on bill passing. Sole trader rights may have been one step toward
equality but it did not guarantee further political opportunities for women. Similar
dynamics took place relative to women’s employment during this time period. Although
more women were moving into nonagricultural employment at the turn of the century,
women were becoming teachers, nurses, and social workers; all traditional women’s
occupations. The West might have provided different conditions and expanding
opportunities for women in some regards but conditions were also gendered and
continued to reinforce traditional gender norms. States granting sole trader rights were
not as fertile arenas for gender politics as one might think.
The number of political parties was predictive of whether or not a bill was
introduced, voted on, and passed. The size of the effect increases with each legislative
stage demonstrating that the importance of third parties gets stronger at each stage.
These findings suggest that pluralism in the political arena is indicative of the extent to
which political minorities can access the political system. In the case of woman suffrage,
third parties, particularly the Progressive Party, were more supportive of woman suffrage.
These findings also provide insight into the late adopting states, Michigan and
New York. The Progressive Party’s attempt to gain presidential votes in the West by
endorsing woman suffrage would have been cause for alarm among politicians in the
East. This is reflected in New York in the 1917 election campaign. To gain women’s
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support, Republican and Democratic district leaders sought women for positions in the
parties previously occupied by men (Dinkin 1995). The New York Times also
recognized the important role women would play in the election campaign of 1912. The
Times reported that the 1912 campaign had become “feminized” because the Progressive
Party supported woman suffrage and involved women in the party (Gustafson 2001).
Progressive support not only helped the woman suffrage movement but its threat
prompted the Republicans and Democrats to include a woman suffrage platform in the
1916 presidential campaign. In fact, this was the first year the Democrats included a
woman suffrage platform in their campaign (Wolbrecht 2000).
To test whether or not the data show that the presence of third parties in state
politics prompted Republican or Democratic support for suffrage, I first ran Model 4 for
bills voted on and bills passed and dropped party support. In the new model, the effect
and significance level of total parties increases. Since party support’s inclusion in the
model decreases the effect of total parties, party support accounts for some of the
variance of total parties. Next, I ran a random-effects logistic regression model with
party support as the dependent variable and total parties as the independent variable. The
log odds were positive and significant (p<.001). This demonstrates that third party
presence prompted party support for suffrage from Democrats and Republicans.
Party support for woman suffrage was predictive of suffrage success at all three
stages in the legislative process. The effect was weak for bills introduced but increased
for bills voted on and bills passed. These findings emphasize the importance of
legitimation in adopting policy innovation benefitting political minorities, particularly
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women. These findings indicate that more in depth analysis is required to discern the
implications of party politics for woman suffrage and other policy issues.

Organizational characteristics
Although organizational imprinting is not significant, it is significant when it is the only
independent variable in the model for each stage. The coefficient in each model is
positive. So, states founded after 1870 were more likely to introduce, vote on, and pass a
suffrage bill. However, when age and legislative size are added to the model the effects
of imprinting disappear. One reason for imprinting’s weak effect might be that it is better
measured by state age and legislative size. Stinchcombe’s (1965) imprinting argument is
that historical time period influences organizational form and produces organizations that
exhibit similar characteristics. State legislatures founded after the Civil War
Amendments were newer and had smaller legislatures. Consequently, the organizational
characteristics used in this study are picking up the effects of imprinting on legislative
activity and success.
States with less structural inertia were more successful in all three phases of the
legislative process but the effects were only consequential for passing a bill. This is not
surprising and shows that newer states were more successful passing suffrage bills. What
about states that granted woman suffrage although they were founded early, such as New
York, which granted woman suffrage in 1917? The effects of structural inertia still help
to explain late adoption. Despite being the birthplace of the woman suffrage movement
and despite being home to the NWSA, New York took 69 years from the Seneca Falls
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Convention to grant suffrage. A woman suffrage bill did not pass both houses of the state
legislature for two consecutive legislative sessions until 1915. That is 67 years after
Seneca Falls. Structural inertia was an element that prevented New York, the nexus of
suffrage activity and ideology, from adopting earlier. Accordingly, inertia helps predict
the timing of success among the late adopters as well as the early adopters. That is, older
states are more likely to take longer to adopt innovations, if they adopt at all.
The size of the state legislature has an effect on introducing a bill and voting on a
bill but the effects are minimal. Larger state legislatures are slightly more likely to
introduce suffrage bills. It makes sense that larger legislatures represent a larger range of
interests and interest groups. Smaller legislatures, on the other hand, were more willing
to vote on suffrage bills but were not willing to pass them. One explanation is that
smaller legislatures may have been easier to coordinate and convince to at least consider
the issue. However, passing the bill was another matter altogether.
The effects of organizational size raise the issue of innovation in relation to large
and small organizations. Small legislatures might be more easily persuaded by a strong
leader. This was the case in Wyoming whose first governor was largely responsible for
the success of woman suffrage. At the other end of the spectrum, large organizations can
be extremely complex and, I think, are susceptible to rapid, even unexpected change. A
survey of studies on organizational complexity and innovation cites studies with
contradicting findings. Some studies find that innovation takes place in smaller, simple
organizations while other studies find that innovation occurs in large, complex
organizations (Damanpour 1996). These disparate findings can be reconciled if a
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curvilinear relationship exists between organizational complexity and innovation. That
is, I surmise that organization innovation occurs most frequently in newer, simple
organizations and also in older, larger, complex organizations. This issue deserves
greater attention by organizational scholars and is an area that should be in the future.
Mimetic isomorphism is only significant in the first stage of the legislative
process but the effects are large. Walker (1969) argues that states look to one another
when legislating policy, and it seems reasonable that isomorphic processes would
influence bill introduction. However, other states in the same region with suffrage is not
a sufficient condition to motivate legislators to pass a woman suffrage bill. Legislators
must answer to their constituency, especially if they want to be reelected. And, other
states granting suffrage in the region would not make a difference in passing suffrage
bills if woman suffrage is unpopular; that is, if voting for suffrage would diminish a
legislator’s chance for reelection. It may also be that I have used the wrong measure of
mimetic isomorphism. The number of states in the region may not be as important as the
number of states in the West that have passed woman suffrage. State legislatures were
aware of the actions of each state that passed suffrage. The more states in the West that
passed suffrage, the more salient the issue became as is evidenced during the time of the
Progressive Party.
The last three variables concern legislative rules and procedures and the effects
are inconsistent between each stage. The effects of constitutional majority are
pronounced for passing a bill. Passing a bill when a smaller majority is required
increased the probability by approximately 20%. This finding should not be
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underestimated considering many votes for woman suffrage were close and lost by a
small margin. This finding confirms the idea that stringent amendment procedures
impact legislative outcome.
It is interesting that the number of sessions required does not significantly
influence a bill passing but it does influence whether or not the legislature votes on a bill.
In other words, requiring two consecutive sessions to amend the constitution increases
the odds that a bill will be voted on. One explanation is that since the bill has to be
introduced and passed in an additional session before it goes to a referendum, legislators
are not threatened by simply voting on the issue. Passing an additional legislative session
requires additional steps and the status quo may not be threatened by a vote under these
circumstances.
Session frequency is also significant for whether or not a bill is voted on. The
less frequently the legislature meets, the more likely they are to vote on a bill. It may be
that the same set of legislators are more likely to be aware of the outcome and they are
more likely to be sure that the status quo will be upheld. Further research should take
into account the extent of legislative turnover between sessions. Though specific effects
need to be explored in greater detail, the overall impact of legislative procedure on voting
on a bill and passing a bill is substantial.

Conclusion
The primary contribution of this study is a greater understanding of the extent to which
state government influences legislative outcomes. Although innovation is often
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prompted by environmental changes, the structure of state government mediates these
changes (Amenta and Halfmann 2000). Institutional politics theory and organizational
theory provide a framework for understanding the processes that constrain environmental
changes at different stages of the legislative process.
Institutional politics theory has a substantial effect on legislative outcome. More
democratized states have a large impact on passing a bill. The findings show that party
politics are also important to the success of woman suffrage. Third party presence was
not only important in state politics but during the 1910s the threat of the Progressive
Party stimulated suffrage support in the national campaigns of the Republicans and
Democrats as well. The literature on the woman suffrage movement has largely ignored
the dynamics of party politics. Party politics have been mostly studied in individual state
histories of woman suffrage. However, this study shows, contrary to other findings (see
McCammon et al. 2001), that third party politics were consequential and deserve further
attention. McCammon et al. determined third party strength by measuring the percent of
third party seats in the legislature. This study differs from McCammon et al. by counting
the number of third parties represented in the state elections. The results indicate that my
measure is a more accurate measure of the influence of third parties on woman suffrage
legislation. My findings suggests that a more accurate measure for McCammon et al.
would be a count of the number of third parties represented in the state legislature.
The overall effects of organizational characteristics were small relative to the
effects of institutional politics. Despite the small effects, the impact of organizational
characteristics on bills introduced shows that the organizational structure can act as a
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filter that constrains changing cultural norms and political agendas. The organizational
characteristics seemed to curbed the extent to which suffrage bills were introduced. In
this way the organizational structure mediates cultural changes, preferences of state
legislators, and preferences of interest groups. As the legislative process proceeded,
organizational characteristics grew less important but their effects became increasingly
substantial. As a result, this study identifies several organizational characteristics that
were consequential to bill passage. Specifically, structural inertia and legislative
majority are robust predictors of whether or not a bill will pass.
Up to this point research on woman suffrage has focused primarily on the national
movement or on cultural changes that led to woman suffrage adoption. These studies do
not, however, help us understand the impact of state building on policy adoption and do
not adequately explain the timing of changes in specific states, especially in the West.
This study demonstrates that understanding the legislative process and party politics
provides insight into the timing of woman suffrage success at the state level. For
instance, New Mexico was the only state in the Intermountain West that did not pass full
woman suffrage. However, their constitutional amendment requirements for granting
woman suffrage were extraordinarily stringent and their party politics were marked by
racial issues–involving Spanish speakers and their attempt to maintain political
power–that were not as prevalent in other western states.
This utility of this study is not only its contribution to the study of woman
suffrage but also to other state-policy issues. The model presented here is not restricted
to historical state-level contexts, such as temperance or civil rights, but also to
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contemporary issues such as same-sex unions and felon disfranchisement. For instance,
Vermont and Hawaii have passed legislation enabling gays and lesbians to obtain samesex unions. Alternatively, California has defeated similar proposals. Why did Vermont
and Hawaii pass same-sex legislation while California did not? I propose that this
question can be answered by examining a state legislature’s capacity for reform by
implementing the same model I use to study woman suffrage success. Such an analysis
would include understanding whether or not a political party supported the issue, the
number of third party challengers, and other organizational characteristics. Some
organizational characteristics not included in my model as a result of a lack of data
should also be considered such as the number and size of legislative committees and
legislators’ political affiliation.
In addition, a study of felon disfranchisement reveals that only two states
currently have no restrictions on felons’ voting rights (Manza and Uggen 2002). These
two states are Maine and Vermont. Thirteen states have the next fewest restrictions.
These restrictions prohibit inmates from voting who are currently serving prison terms.
Hawaii is one of these states thirteen states. It should not be surprising that two of the
same states are progressive in the cases of same-sex unions and felon disfranchisement:
Vermont and Hawaii. A study of the characteristics of state government in Vermont and
Hawaii should reveal less stringent legislative requirements and also a more accessible
political system.
Understanding the organizational characteristics and the party politics of state
government from 1848 to 1918 demonstrate why some states were late adopters of
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woman suffrage and why some were early adopters. Despite organizational resources,
New York was one of the last states to adopt woman suffrage. This is attributed to
legislative constraints and also partisan politics preceding the 1917 suffrage campaign
which prompted the inclusion of women as party workers and as electors. This study
helps us understand why some states, particularly in the West, were early adopters of
woman suffrage; why some states were late adopters of woman suffrage; and why some
states never adopted woman suffrage.
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Table 1. States and Territories Granting Full Woman Suffrage before the Nineteenth
Amendment
State/Territory

Year

State

Year

State

Year

Wyoming
Territory

1869

Washington

1910

Montana

1914

Utah Territory

1870

California

1911

New York

1917

Wyoming

1890

Kansas

1912

Michigan

1918

Colorado

1893

Oregon

1912

South
Dakota

1918

Utah

1896

Arizona

1912

Oklahoma

1918

Idaho

1896

Nevada

1914

Source: Schiffman (1998)
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Table 2. Majority Vote in the Gubernatorial Election Previous to the Adoption of
Woman Suffrage
Year

State

1890

Wyoming

1893

Political Party

Year

State

Republican

1912

Oregon

Democrat

Colorado

Populist

1914

Montana

Democrat

1896

Utah

Republican

1914

Nevada

Democrat

1896

Idaho

People’s

1917

New York

DemocratRepublican

1910

Washington

Republican

1918

Michigan

Republican

1911

California

Republican

1918

South
Dakota

Republican

1912

Kansas

Democrat

1918

Oklahoma

Republican

1912

Arizona

Democrat

Source: Gubernatorial Elections 1787-1997 (1998)
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Political
Party

Table 3. Year of Adoption of Woman Suffrage, Year of First Suffrage Organization
State

Year of Adoption

First Organization

First Bill

Arizona

1912

1891

1883

Arkansas

**

1884

1891

California

1911

1869

1889

Colorado

1893

1876

1870

Idaho

1896

1893

1871

Iowa

**

1870

1866

Kansas

1912

1865

1867

Louisiana

**

1892

1910

Minnesota

**

1868

1895

Missouri

**

1867

1867

Montana

1914

1890

1871

Nebraska

**

1871

1856

Nevada

1914

1894

1869

New Mexico

**

1909

1874

North Dakota

**

1885

1868

Oklahoma

1918

1895

1897

Oregon

1912

1870

1872

South Dakota

1918

1885

1868

Texas

**

1893

1875

Utah

1896 (1870)

1887

1872

Washington

1910

1871

1854

Wyoming

1890 (1869)

**

1869

Source: King (2001)
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Table 4. Year of Statehood and Suffrage Success
Year of
Statehood
1776-1800

States
Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Kentucky, Maryland,
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York,
North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina,
Tennessee, Vermont, Virginia (n=16)

Full
Suffrage

Proportion

1

.0625

1801-1825

Alabama, Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana, Maine, Mississippi,
Missouri, Ohio (n=8)

0

.0000

1826-1850

Arkansas, California, Florida, Iowa, Michigan, Texas,
Wisconsin (n=7)

2

.2857

1851-1875

Kansas, Minnesota, Nebraska, Nevada, Oregon, West
Virginia (n=6)

3

.5000

1876-1900

Colorado, Idaho, Montana, North Dakota, South Dakota,
Utah, Washington, Wyoming (n=8)

7

.8750

1901-1925

Arizona, New Mexico, Oklahoma (n=3)*

2

.6667

15

.0208

Total (n=48)
Source: Book of the States 1945-1946; Beeton (1986).
*The last states to join the Union were established in 1912.
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Table5 . Constitutional Amendment Requirements for Legislative Proposals from 1848* to 1918.
State

Year

Const.
Majority

Sessions
Required

Sess.
Freq.

State

Year

Const.
Majority

Sessions
Required

Sess.
Freq

AL

1848

2/3

2

1

KS

1861

3/5

1

1

1875

2/3

2

2

KY

1848

NA

NA

1

1901

3/5

1

4

1850

NA

NA

2

1848

2/3

2

2

1890

3/5

1

2

1868

1/2

2

2

1848

3/5

2

2

1874

1/2

1

2

1852

2/3

1

1

AZ

1912

1/2

1

2

1864

1/2

1

1

CA

1849

1/2

2

1

1868

2/3

1

1

1879

2/3

1

2

1879

2/3

1

2

CO

1876

2/3

1

2

MA

1848

2/3

2

1

CT

1848

2/3

2

1

MD

1848

NA

NA

1

DE

1848

3/4

2

2

1851

NA

NA

2

1897

2/3

2

2

1864

3/5

1

2

1848

2/3

2

1

ME

1848

2/3

1

1

1865

NA

NA

1

MI

1848

2/3

2

1

1868

2/3

2

1

1850

2/3

1

2

1885

3/5

1

2

MN

1858

1/2

1

2

1848

2/3

2

1

MO

1848

2/3

2

2

1877

2/3

1

2

1865

1/2

1

2

1848

NA

NA

2

1848

2/3

1

2

1857

1/2

2

2

1868

2/3

1

2

ID

1890

2/3

1

2

1890

2/3

1

4

IL

1848

2/3

2

2

MT

1889

2/3

1

2

1870

2/3

1

2

NC

1848

2/3

2

2

1848

NA

NA

1

1868

2/3

2

1

1851

NA

NA

2

1876

3/5

1

2

1857

1/2

2

2

1889

1/2

2

2

AR

FL

GA

IA

IN

LA

MS

ND
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Table5 . Continued.
State

Year

Const.
Majority

Sessions
Required

Sess.
Freq.

State

Year

Const.
Majority

Sessions
Required

Sess.
Freq

NE

1867

NA

NA

2

SC

1865

2/3

2

1

1875

3/5

1

2

SD

1889

1/2

1

2

NJ

1848

2/3

2

1

TN

1848

2/3

2

2

NM

1912

3/4

1

2

TX

1848

2/3

2

2

NV

1864

1/2

2

2

1868

2/3

2

1

NY

1848

1/2

2

1

1876

2/3

1

2

OH

1848

NA

NA

1

1848

NA

NA

2

1851

3/5

1

2

1870

1/2

2

1

OK

1907

1/2

1

2

1902

1/2

2

2

OR

1859

1/2

2

2

VT

1848

2/3

2

2

1906

1/2

1

2

WA

1889

2/3

1

2

1848

1/2

2

1

WI

1848

1/2

2

1

1873

1/2

2

2

WV

1863

1/2

2

1

RI

1848

1/2

2

1

1872

2/3

1

2

SC

1848

1/2

1

1

PA

VA

Source: State Constitutions.
*Starting year is 1848 or the year of statehood. Ending year is 1918 or the year that woman suffrage was
granted.
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Table 6. The Number of Sessions in Which a Full Woman Suffrage Bill was Introduced, Voted on, and
Passed, 1848 to 1918.
Introduced

Voted on

Passed

Decade

Total
Sessions

H

S

Total

H

S

Total

H

S

Total

1848-1849

55

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1850-1859

285

1

3

4

0

3

3

0

2

2

1860-1869

337

12

5

17

6

2

8

4

2

6

1870-1879

345

31

15

46

19

5

24

7

3

10

1880-1889

298

35

31

66

19

19

38

9

11

20

1890-1899

270

50

46

96

19

22

41

7

15

22

1900-1909

254

55

27

82

15

11

26

6

6

12

1910-1918

195

116

89

205

49

47

96

28

26

54

Total

2039

300

216

516

127

109

236

61

65

126

Source: House and Senate Journals, 1848 to 1918
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Table 7. Means and Standard Deviations of Independent Variables
Bill Introduced
(N=1683)

Bill Voted
(N=347)

Bill Passed
(N=206)

Variable

Mean

STD

Mean

STD

Mean

STD

Year

1883.1

19.7

1898.0

16.1

1897.0

16.4

Democratization

0.9

0.7

1.3

0.9

1.3

0.9

Sole trader

0.5

0.5

0.8

0.4

0.8

0.4

Total Parties

2.2

0.7

2.5

0.9

2.6

0.9

Party support

0.1

0.3

0.3

0.5

0.4

0.5

Imprinting

0.0

0.2

0.1

0.3

0.2

0.4

Structural inertia

66.3

35.0

67.6

39.7

60.5

40.0

Organizational size

143.6

57.4

148.3

53.8

137.6

53.4

Mimetic isomorphism

0.0

0.4

0.2

0.7

0.3

0.8

Constitutional majority

0.6

0.1

0.6

0.1

0.6

0.1

Sessions required

1.6

0.5

1.5

0.5

1.6

0.5

Session frequency

1.5

0.5

1.7

0.5

1.7

0.5
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Democratize

1.00

Sole
Trader

.344

1.00

Total
Parties

.101

.038

1.00

Party
Supp

.254

.264

.202

1.00

Impri

.076

.236

.104

.165

1.00

Inertia

.491

.180

-.117

.053

-.392

1.00

Size

.148

.205

-.016

.046

-.173

.424

1.00

Mim
Isom

.150

.147

.129

.172

.172

-.150

-.121

1.00

Const
Maj

-.084

-.100

-.093

-.049

-.049

.145

.078

.013

1.00

Sess
Req

.024

-.244

-.010

-.102

-.177

.156

.007

-.111

-.125

1.00

Sess
Freq

.076

.061

-.007

.019

.139

-.059

-.123

.087

.041

-.368
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Sess Freq

Sess Req

Const
Majority

Mimetic
Isomorph

Size

Inertia

Imprint

Party Support

Total Parties

Sole Trader

Democratize

Table 8. Correlation Matrix for Independent Variables

1.00

Table 9. Random-Effects Logistic Regression Model of Bill Introduction (standard errors).
Variable

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Year

.077***
(.008)

.082***
(.008)

.084***
(.010)

.077***
(.008)

-.509***
(.152)

Institutional Politics
Democratization

-.556***
(.149)

-.495***
(.152)

Sole trader

-.226
(.233)

-.163
(.243)

Total parties

.478***
(.107)

.426***
(.108)

.429***
(.108)

Party support

1.103***
(.208)

1.055***
(.208)

1.021***
(.207)

Organizational Characteristics
Imprinting

-.824
(.541)

-.662
(.561)

Structural inertia
(state age)

-.021***
(.006)

-.014**
(.006)

-.009*
(.004)

Organizational size

.005*
(.002)

.005*
(.002)

.003
(.002)

Mimetic isomorphism
(states in region with suffrage)

.639**
(.240)

.627**
(.248)

.556*
(.241)

Constitutional majority

-3.802*
(1.731)

-4.718**
(1.765)

-5.507***
(1.669)

Sessions required

.396
(.279)

.423
(.291)

Session frequency

.205
(.222)

.312
(.235)

Constant

-147.432***
(14.799)

-154.684***
(14.664)

-159.322***
(18.033)

-145.079***
(14.082)

Log likelihood

-627.119

-641.490

-615.295

-617.778

rho

.253

.112

.123

.131

Number of sessions

1683

1683

1683

1683

Number of states

45

45

45

45

*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 (two-tailed tests)
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Table 10. Random-Effects Logistic Regression Model of Bill Voted (standard errors).
Variable

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Year

-.033*
(.014)

.017
(.011)

-.021
(.015)

-.010
(.012)

Institutional Politics
Democratization

.400
(.263)

.304
(.233)

Sole trader

.857*
(.417)

1.146**
(.378)

1.158**
(.369)

Total parties

.308+
(.168)

.270+
(.166)

.251
(.162)

Party support

.915**
(.316)

.869**
(.313)

.956**
(.306)

Organizational Characteristics
Imprinting

.445
(.699)

-.075
(.719)

Structural inertia
(state age)

-.013+
(.007)

-.009
(.007)

-.008
(.005)

Organizational size

-.005
(.003)

-.007*
(.003)

-.008**
(.003)

Mimetic isomorphism
(states in region with suffrage)

.198
(.300)

.139
(.301)

Constitutional majority

2.071
(2.434)

2.239
(2.378)

Sessions required

1.383***
(.431)

1.408***
(.436)

1.287***
(.379)

Session frequency

.625+
(.351)

1.072**
(.364)

.993**
(.346)

Constant

60.801*
(26.467)

-34.325
(21.877)

33.977
(27.933)

15.493
(22.071)

Log likelihood

-211.275

-210.422

-197.879

-199.406

rho

.244

.081

.061

.052

N

347

347

347

347

Number of groups

44

44

44

44

+p<.05 (one-tailed test), *p<.05 (two-tailed test), **p<.01, ***p<.001
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Table 11. Random-Effects Logistic Regression Model of Bills Passed (standard errors).
Variable

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Year

-.035*
(.018)

.040**
(.014)

-.005
(.021)

-.014
(.016)

.797**
(.288)

Institutional Politics
Democratization

.803**
(.318)

.783**
(.302)

Sole trader

.229
(.455)

-.203
(.457)

Total parties

.450*
(.190)

.346+
(.198)

.334+
(.188)

Party support

.628+
(.365)

.834*
(.380)

.885*
(.363)

Organizational Characteristics
Imprinting

.367
(.610)

.358
(.650)

Structural inertia
(state age)

-.020**
(.007)

-.022**
(.008)

Organizational size

.003
(.003)

.004
(.004)

Mimetic isomorphism
(states in region with suffrage)

-.259
(.224)

-.325
(.245)

Constitutional majority

-3.548
(2.612)

-4.034
(2.866)

Sessions required

.125
(.444)

.075
(.470)

Session frequency

-.629+
(.343)

-.104
(.387)

-.017***
(.005)

-4.775*
(2.19)

Constant

64.060
(33.453)

-72.721**
(26.714)

10.513
(40.204)

29.890
(29.369)

Log likelihood

-130.602

-128.916

-119.438

-121.032

rho

.078

2.53e-07

2.53e-07

2.53e-07

N

206

206

206

206

Number of groups

42

42

42

42

+p<.05 (one-tailed test), *p<.05 (two-tailed test), **p<.01, ***p<.001
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Table 12. Probabilities for the Significant Independent Variables
Variable

Value

Bill Introduced

Bill Voted

Bill Passed

Year

1854
1883
1918

0.0055
0.0049
0.4313

Democratization

0
1
2
3

0.0762
0.0473
0.0290
0.0176

Sole trader

0
1

Total parties

1
2
3
4

0.0297
0.0449
0.0673
0.0998

0.4627
0.5253
0.5872
0.6464

0.3461
0.4251
0.5079
0.8857

Party support

0
1

0.0434
0.1119

0.4880
0.7043

0.3885
0.6060

Structural inertia

25th percentile
50th percentile
75th percentile

0.0618
0.0487
0.0351

Organizational size

25th percentile
50th percentile
75th percentile

0.0433
0.0478
0.0529

Mimetic isomorphism

0
1
2
3
4

0.0475
0.0799
0.1315
0.2089
0.3153

Constitutional majority

.51
.67

0.0799
0.0348

Sessions required

1
2

0.3973
0.7048

Session frequency

1
2

0.3849
0.6282

0.2425
0.4153
0.6118
0.7777
0.3419
0.6233
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0.6199
0.4735
0.3316
0.6108
0.5525
0.5127

0.5521
0.3647
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